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Harmonising Occupational Health and Safety Regulation in Australia: The First 






Occupational health and safety (OHS) in Australia has, to date, been regulated by one 
Commonwealth, six State and two Territory general OHS statutes,1 together with a 
number of specific statutes covering public safety and OHS in industries such as mining, 
the maritime industry, transport, electricity and dangerous goods.2  
 
The Australian model of OHS regulation3 places broad general duties on a range of 
parties materially influencing OHS (employers, self-employed persons, persons in control 
of workplaces, employees, designers, manufacturers and suppliers of plant, substances 
and structures), supplemented by regulations and codes of practice which provide further 
detail and guidance.  Compliance with these standards is monitored and enforced by 
inspectorates with broad powers of inspection and empowered to take enforcement 
measures ranging from informal measures (advice and persuasion), to administrative 
sanctions (improvement, prohibition and infringement notices), accepting enforceable 
undertakings, and formal prosecution. All of the statutes now contain provisions for the 
election of employee health and safety representatives and committees. Health and safety 
representatives are given significant powers and functions including inspection, 
information, consultation rights, and in some jurisdictions, the power to enforce via 
                                                 
  Socio-Legal Research Centre, Griffith Law School, Griffith University and National 
Research Centre for Occupational Health and Safety Regulation, Regulatory Institutions 
Network, Australian National University. An earlier version of this paper was included in 
the National Research Centre for Occupational Health and Safety Regulation working 
paper series (Working Paper 61). My sincere thanks to Liz Bluff for her comments and 
very helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. My thanks, too, to the Journal’s 
anonymous referees for their suggestions. 
1   The general statutes are the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991 (Cth) (federal public 
sector employment and self-insurers under the Commonwealth workers’ compensation 
legislation), the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW), the  Occupational Health and 
Safety Act 2004, the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995,  the Occupational Health, Safety and 
Welfare Act 1986 (SA), the Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984 (WA), Workplace Health and 
Safety Act 1995 (Tas), the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1989 (ACT), and the Workplace 
Health and Safety Act 2007 (NT). 
2  Examples include the Electrical Safety Act 2002 (Qld), Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 
(Qld);  and the Dangerous Goods Safety Management Act 2001 (Qld). 
3  The model was originally based on the British Robens Report (Robens A. (Lord) Report of 
the Committee on Safety and Health at Work, 1970-72, HMSO, London, Cmnd 5034, 1972). 
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provisional improvement notices and the right to direct that dangerous work cease. 
While all of the OHS statutes conform to this basic model, closer scrutiny reveals 
sometimes quite major differences in form, detail and substantive matters between the 
OHS statutes and the regulations and codes of practice made under those statutes.  
 
The differences in the Australian OHS statutes, regulations and codes of practice mean 
that workers in different jurisdictions who face essentially similar risks are afforded 
different levels of legal protection; that organisations conducting business in more than 
one State or Territory are faced with inconsistent standards and enforcement approaches 
which make compliance complex and costly; and that there are incentives for industry to 
move to jurisdictions with less stringent or costly regulation, and for State and Territory 
governments to compete by reducing the levels of their OHS standards and enforcement 
activity. 4 Not surprisingly, since the early 1980s, at least, there have been calls for a more 
uniform system. 
 
This article examines a current major initiative aimed at harmonising Australian OHS 
regulation. In April 2008, the Federal Labor government commissioned a major National 
Review into Model Occupational Health and Safety Laws. The Panel conducting the Review 
has been asked to examine the principal Commonwealth, State and Territory OHS 
statutes to identify areas of best practice, common practice and inconsistency and to 
make recommendations to the Workplace Relations Ministers Council (WRMC) on the 
optimal structure and content of a model OHS Act, which would then be adopted by 
each of the Australian States, Territories and the Commonwealth. This is the first 
thorough and serious attempt to establish uniform OHS legislation in each jurisdiction 
and there appears to be considerable political support for the process. Despite the poor 
                                                 
4  See Kirby, M, ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Time for Reform’, paper delivered at the 
National Safety Council of Australia Occupational Health and Safety Seminar, Canberra, 
27 July, 1984, 1984,  9-10; Lee, M and Quinlan,, M, ‘Co-ordinating the Regulation of 
Occupational Health and Safety in Australia: Legal and Political Obstacles and Legal 
Developments’ (1994) 7 Australian Journal of Labour Law 33, 38; Gunningham, N, 
Safeguarding the Worker: Job Hazards and the Role of Law, Law Book Co, Sydney, 1984, 29-31; 
Industry Commission, Work, Health and Safety, Industry Commission, Melbourne, 1995, 
Vol I, pp 47, 147-157; Vol II, Appendix H), and Productivity Commission, National 
Workers Compensation and Occupational Health and Safety Frameworks, Report No 27, Productivity 
Commission, Canberra, 2004, 69-72; National Review into Model Occupational Health 
and Safety Laws, First Report to the Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council, Commonwealth of 
Australia, October 2008, 6. 
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track record of past efforts to achieve national consistency,5 there is a widespread view 
that the current process has a reasonable chance of success. 
 
The article briefly outlines the history of attempts to develop nationally uniform OHS 
statutes, regulations and codes of practice. It then introduces the National OHS Review 
and analyses the First Report of the Review Panel to the WRMC in late October 2008.   
 
1. A Brief History of Uniformity Processes 
The first major initiative towards national OHS policy came in 1985, with the 
establishment of the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC), a 
tripartite body comprising representatives of the Australian federal, State and Territory 
governments, and of employers and trade unions. NOHSC’s powers were quite limited, 
and largely concerned with promoting OHS awareness and debate; and providing a 
national focus and a forum for OHS policies and strategies.6 
 
A 1990 review7 of OHS in Australia concluded that for OHS to improve there needed to 
be uniform legislation and standards throughout the country. The Ministers of Labour 
Advisory Committee (MOLAC), comprising Commonwealth, State and Territory 
Ministers of Labour, agreed in the same year that, ‘as far as practicable, any standards 
endorsed by the NOHSC will be accepted as minimum standards and implemented in 
the State/Territory jurisdiction as soon as possible after endorsement.’ Then in 
November 1991 the Premiers of the States and Chief Ministers of the Territories reached 
an agreement (which was supported by the Commonwealth) that they would ‘achieve 
nationally uniform OHS standards and uniform standards in relation to dangerous goods 
by the end of 1993.’8 The basic strategy was to work towards removing legislative 
impediments to adoption, by State and Territory governments, of national standards and 
codes of practice developed by NOHSC. MOLAC, through a Senior Officers’ Group, 
                                                 
5  See the discussion below. 
6    See National Occupational Health and Safety Commission Act 1985 (Cth), especially ss 7 
(Objects) and 8 (Functions). 
7  Australia. Department of Industrial Relations, Review of Occupational Health and Safety in 
Australia: report by the Review Committee to the Minister for Industrial Relations, 
Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra, 1990, p 25. 
8  National Uniformity Taskforce, National Uniformity for Occupational Health and Safety 
Standards, Policies and Procedures, National Occupational Health and Safety Commission, 
Sydney, 1992, p 1. 
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was to work towards standardising the principal OHS Acts. NOHSC, through a tripartite 
National Uniformity Taskforce established in December 1991, would develop national 
standards, which State and Territory governments would uniformly adopt through their 
processes to make regulations and codes of practice.  
 
The principal focus of the national uniformity effort in the early 1990s was the 
development of national OHS standards and codes of practice for ‘first order’9 priority 
issues (manual handling, plant, hazardous substances, noise, certification of occupations 
and major hazards). Uniformity of the OHS statutes was a lesser focus with limited 
initiatives aimed at facilitating the adoption of national standards and codes of practice 
by removing differences in the OHS statutes with regard to the coverage of OHS 
legislation, the evidentiary status of approved codes of practice, regulation making 
powers and inconsistencies in drafting conventions.10 Priority was also given to 
harmonising compliance and enforcement policies. But even these issues were not fully 
addressed, and the current OHS statutes still have significant differences on these 
matters.   
 
The process of standards development and adoption, overseen by the National 
Uniformity Task Force, proved to be cumbersome, slow and lacking consistency across 
the different Australian jurisdictions. It usually involved a tripartite process within each 
jurisdiction in which the national proposals might be accepted, accepted with 
modifications on the grounds of unique jurisdictional differences, or rejected. As the 
Industry Commission noted in its 1995 Report into Work Health and Safety11 noted, 
adoption by States and Territories was inconsistent as some incorporated the provisions 
into their OHS statutes or regulations (making them mandatory) while others 
incorporated them into codes of practice or guidance notes (which permitted duty 
holders to achieve the required results in a variety of ways). The actual content of 
implemented standards varied markedly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and progress in 
                                                 
9  The Taskforce developed a set of priorities (based on a scale of 1 to 12) based on 
judgments about the severity of the hazard, the capacity to enhance productivity and the 
significance in terms of national uniformity. See National Uniformity Taskforce, National 
Uniformity for Occupational Health and Safety Standards, Policies and Procedures, National 
Occupational Health and Safety Commission, Sydney, 1992. 
10  Ibid, 3. 
11   Australia. Industry Commission, Work, Health and Safety: an inquiry into occupational 
health and safety, Industry Commission, Melbourne, 1995, Vol 1, 152-157. 
 5 
the implementation of the standards was slow as a result of the consultation and 
regulatory impact requirements in some jurisdictions, and the difficulties of tailoring 
national standards and codes to the needs of the different jurisdictions.. The Industry 
Commission recommended the development of template legislation for the core 
elements of OHS legislation, together with consistency in enforcement across 
jurisdictions.12  
 
The national uniformity process was not complete when the Howard government came 
to power in 1996, and that government significantly down-sized NOHSC. The move 
towards national uniformity slowed dramatically after mid-1996. By the end of 1996 
NOHSC had declared six first order priority national standards – noise, manual handling, 
hazardous substances, plant, certification for users and operators of industrial equipment 
and major hazards facilities. From 1997, the National Uniformity process was conducted 
under the WRMC. The Dangerous Goods standard was subsequently declared in 2001.13  
In 2002, NOHSC formulated a National Occupational Health and Safety Strategy 2002–2012 
which established nine national targets and priorities, including ‘a nationally consistent 
regulatory framework’.14 Implementation of the Strategy rests with the individual 
jurisdictions and while some would argue their action plans lack uniformity in both 
content and pace, the Strategy has not only provided a common focus and de facto 
organising principles for planning and use of resources for the various OHS regulators, 
but also influenced the national approaches of the social partners national approaches.15  
In 2005 NOHSC was replaced by the Australian Safety and Compensation Commission 
(ASCC), implementing a recommendation of the Productivity Commission’s 2004 
Report on National Workers Compensation and Occupational Health and Safety Frameworks.16 
That Report also addressed the issue of harmonising OHS regulation in Australia. It 
                                                 
12   Ibid, 162–6. 
13  National Standard for the Storage and Handling of Workplace Dangerous Goods, National 
Occupational Health and Safety Commission:1015, 2001 
14  National Occupational Health and Safety Commission, National Occupational Health and 
Safety Strategy 2002-2012, National Occupational Health and Safety Commission, Canberra, 
2002, p 10. 
15  See: 
http://www.ascc.gov.au/ascc/newsevents/mediareleases/mediarelease20november2008au
straliansafetyandcompensationcouncilmeetsincanberra.htm. 
16   Productivity Commission, National Workers Compensation and Occupational Health and Safety 
Frameworks, Report No 27, Productivity Commission, Canberra, March 2004, p 72. 
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assessed five approaches to developing a national framework for OHS regulation. These 
included:17 
 a single national OHS regime to replace those operated by the States and 
Territories; 
 an alternative national regime operating in parallel with State and Territory 
regimes; 
 template legislation and regulation; 
 mutual recognition; and 
 progressive development of national uniformity through strengthening aspects 
of the existing cooperative approach. 
 
One of the difficulties with the first approach is that there is no clear Commonwealth 
government head of power upon which to base a National OHS Act. Of course, the 
High Court decision in the 2006 Work Choices Case18 significantly expanded the 
corporations power (placitum 51(xx) of the Australian Constitution), suggesting the head 
of power could be appropriate for national OHS regulation.  However, many OHS 
actors, particularly small businesses (including tradespeople and other contractors) would 
be excluded from coverage of legislation based on that head of power. The heads of 
power that might best support national OHS legislation would either be the external 
affairs power (placitum 51 (xxix)) or the referral of powers by the states power (placitum 
51 (xxxvii). The former is not ideal as it is difficult to find an appropriate international 
convention upon which to base the power. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
Convention Concerning Occupational Safety and Health and the Working Environment No 155 of 
1981, ratified by Australia in 2004, is too narrow in its scope to be able to support the 
enactment of an OHS statute able to address contemporary OHS issues in Australia.  A 
more likely prospect would be national legislation based on ILO Convention 187 of 
2006, Convention Concerning the Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health, which 
came into force earlier this year, but which has yet to be ratified by Australia. That 
Convention requires countries that ratify the convention to have a safety management 
system framework at a national level.  
                                                 
17    Ibid. 
18  New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 231 ALR 1. 
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After considering the various approaches, the Productivity Commission recommended19  
that a single uniform national OHS regime which is focussed on preventing workplace 
injury and illness should be the medium term reform objective for OHS. It would build on 
the initiative of the recently agreed national strategy.  
To achieve this. the Commission is proposing two broad approaches, to operate in parallel. 
The first approach adapts the current cooperative model by strengthening the national 
institutional structure based on NOHSC and the WRMC — emphasising the timely 
development of best-practice national OHS standards and their implementation uniformly 
throughout Australia. Such an approach should be commenced immediately. The second 
approach is to progressively open up access to the existing Australian Government OHS 
regime, giving firms the choice of a single set of national OHS rules. The two approaches 
are not dependant on each other. Each has merits that would warrant their independent 
introduction. 
The second of these approaches was implemented in 2007, through amendments to the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991 (Cth) (OHSA(Cth)) which provided that employers 
licensed to self-insure under the Commonwealth workers compensation Act20 were 
regulated by the OHSA (Cth), rather than by the State and Territory OHS statutes.21 This 
has resulted in a fractured and complex system with some employers operating under the 
OHSA (Cth) and engaging contractors who are regulated under various state OHS 
legislation.  At the same time there is a concern that the departure of large employers 
might progressively undermine the viability of State and Territory workers’ compensation 
regimes. In December 2007 the new federal Minister for Employment and Workplace 
Relations announced a moratorium on granting further self-insurance licenses22 and in 
January 2008 initiated a Review of the self-insurance arrangements under the Comcare 
scheme. 23 At the time of writing this review was not completed. 
The first of the approaches recommended by the Productivity Commission, establishing 
a single national OHS regime, is the focus of the remainder of this article. 
 
2. The National OHS Review 
                                                 
19    Productivity Commission, 2004, above n 16, p 96. 
20  Part VIII of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth). 
21  See OHS and SRC Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (Cth), and in particular ss 3 and 3A and 
Schedule 1. 
22  The Hon Julia Gillard, Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, Media Release 
11 December 2007, available at 
http://mediacentre.dewr.gov.au/mediacentre/allreleases/2007/december/governmentann
ouncesmoratoriumonnewcompaniesjoiningcomcare.htm. 
23  The Hon Julia Gillard, Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, Media Release 





In February 2006, under the former Liberal-National Party Coalition federal government, 
the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) agreed to improve the development 
and adoption of national OHS standards, and the ASCC began reviewing the national 
OHS framework to improve national consistency and identify priorities for 
harmonisation.24  In October 2007, in the lead up to the 2007 Federal election, the then 
opposition federal Australian Labor Party (ALP) announced that if it won the election a 
new national body would replace the ASCC, to drive harmonisation of OHS laws and to 
streamline workers' compensation through co-operative federalism, rather than a federal 
takeover.25 The ALP's OHS policy was based on two fundamental, non-negotiable 
principles – the right of all employees to a safe and healthy workplace, and the right of 
employers to expect that workers would fully cooperate with providing a safe and healthy 
working environment and not use OHS issues for unrelated industrial purposes. 
 
In its meeting in March 2008, the COAG agreed that OHS harmonisation was a top 
priority and stated that its commitment to the reform would be reflected in an 
intergovernmental agreement, which would be finalised by May.26 The COAG endorsed 
a national OHS review reporting to the WRMC, and intended to lead to harmonised 
OHS legislation within five years. 
In late April 2008, the federal Workplace Relations Minister announced the terms of 
reference and membership of the three-person panel that would conduct the National 
OHS Review.27 Chaired by former NOHSC Chief Executive Officer, Mr Robin Stewart-
Crompton, the National OHS Review Panel was charged with reviewing OHS legislation 
in all jurisdictions and making recommendations to the WRMC on the optimal structure 
and content of a model OHS Act. The Review was to be conducted in two stages. The 
first stage was to include a review of the provisions pertaining to the duties of care 
                                                 
24  Council of Australian Govermnents’ Communique, 10 February 2006, available at 
http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/2006-02-10/index.cfm. 
25  Policy announced 24 October 2007 and available at 
http:www.alp.org.au/download/now/20071023_ohs_policy_final_electronic_distribution.
pdf. 
26    Council of Australian Govermnents’ Communique, 26 March 2008, available at 
http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/2008-03-26/index.cfm. 
27       The Hon Julia Gillard, Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, Media Release 




(including the identification of duty holders and the scope and limits of duties) and the 
nature and structure of offences and defences. It was to report to the WRMC by 31 
October 2008. The second stage was to consider the remaining issues, including 
provisions for workplace-based consultation, participation and representation; provisions 
for enforcement and compliance; regulation making powers; permits and licensing 
arrangements for high risk workers; and the role of OHS regulatory agencies, and was to 
report by the end of January 2009. 
The key terms of reference required the National OHS Review to consult widely; to 
examine the principal OHS legislation of each jurisdiction to identify areas of best 
practice, common practice and inconsistency; to take into account the changing nature of 
work and employment arrangements; and make recommendations on the optimal 
structure and content of a model OHS Act that would promote safe workplaces, increase 
certainty for duty holders, reduce compliance costs for business and provide greater 
clarity for regulators without compromising safety outcomes.  
The National OHS Review Panel is to be guided by the following principles: 
 an inclusive approach to the harmonisation process, where the concerns and 
suggestions of all jurisdictions and interested stakeholders are sought and properly 
considered;  
 development of model OHS legislation to be accompanied by an increase in 
consistency of monitoring and enforcement of OHS standards across jurisdictions;  
 consideration of the resource implications for all levels of government in 
administering harmonised laws;  
 the observance of the directive of the COAG that in developing harmonised OHS 
legislation there be no reduction or compromise in standards for legitimate safety 
concerns. 
In July 2008 the Commonwealth, State and Territory governments concluded the 
Intergovernmental Agreement for Regulatory and Operational Reform in Occupational Health and 
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Safety which formalised the protocol and timetable for the harmonisation of OHS laws.28 
The parties agreed to (i) the development of legislation for a new body to replace the 
ASCC; (ii) the development, monitoring and maintenance of model OHS legislation; and 
(iii) the adoption and implementation of the model OHS legislation by each jurisdiction. 
The Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) specifies that the WRMC is to work 
cooperatively (i) to harmonise OHS legislation (the model OHS Act, regulations and 
codes of practice), (ii) to develop a nationally consistent approach to enforcement, and 
(iii) to ensure terms of agreement are complied with.  
The process for harmonisation outlined by the IGA is as follows. The WRMC will 
consider and respond to recommendations of the National Review and will decide on the 
optimal structure and content of a model OHS Act to be adopted by all jurisdictions.  
The body replacing ASCC (which we now know will be Safe Work Australia)29 will be 
responsible for the development, monitoring and maintenance of the model OHS Act 
and model regulations and codes of practice, and a national compliance and enforcement 
policy. When the WRMC agrees to the proposed model OHS Act by consensus, it will 
become the agreed model OHS Act.   Each Party will then take all necessary steps to give 
effect to the model Act by December 2011, and they have committed themselves to 
ensure that their OHS laws will remain nationally uniform over time. Jurisdictions can 
enact additional provisions, but if these provisions affect the operation of the model 
OHS laws, the party has to submit a proposal to the WRMC for approval. 
From its inception in April, the National OHS Review Panel conducted extensive 
consultations with all interested parties, and in late May it released an Issues Paper,30 
based on its consultations. The Issues Paper invited written submissions in response to 
the matters discussed in the paper. The Issues Paper contained 152 questions, and 
addressed nine broad areas of OHS Regulation: 
1. Legislative approach (regulatory structure, title, objects and principles). 
                                                 
28   Intergovernmental Agreement for Regulatory and Operational Reform in Occupational Health and Safety, 
3 July 2008 available at http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/2008-07-
03/docs/OHS_IGA.rtf. 
29  See Safe Work Australia Bill 2008 (Cth). 
30   Australia, National Review into Model OHS Laws: Issues Paper, Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra, May 2008. 
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2. Scope, application and definitions (industry sectors, public safety, workplace and non-
workplaces, responding to change - work organisation and relationships, and 
emerging hazards and risks). 
3. Duties of care: who owes them and to whom? (the current approach, the issue of control – 
chain of responsibility and shared responsibilities; work relationships – self-
employed persons and various kinds of workers; duties of employers; duties of 
workers and others, appointed persons and officers – duty holder support; duties 
of persons in control and activities which impact on health and safety – design, 
manufacture, supply, import, installation, erection, decommission and disposal). 
4. Reasonably practicable and risk management. 
5. Consultation, participation and representation (duty to consult; participation and 
representation – health and safety representatives and committees; union right of 
entry; issue resolution and the right to cease unsafe work). 
6. Regulator powers, functions and accountability (role and functions of regulators: 
accountability and education, advice and assistance; inspectors; and internal review 
of inspectors’ decisions). 
7. Compliance and enforcement (enforcement measures; measures exercised at the 
workplace - safety directions, warnings and cautions; provisional improvement 
notices; improvement, infringement and prohibition notices; and measures 
exercised beyond the workplace; remedial orders and injunctions, and enforceable 
undertakings). 
8. Prosecutions (criminal or civil liability; where prosecutions should be heard; who may 
commence prosecutions and relevant procedures; evidence; the burden of proof 
and defences; liability of officers; fines and other sentencing options; workplace 
death and serious injury; enforcement of penalties). 
9. Other matters important to OHS (regulation making, codes of practice, notification 
of incidents and reporting; external appeals and issue resolution; tripartite 
mechanisms; mutual recognition; cross jurisdictional cooperation and interaction of 
Federal and State laws). 
 
The Panel attended over 80 meetings and spoke to more than 260 individuals 
representing over 100 organisations, including regulators, employer associations, industry 
 12 
associations, trade unions, lawyers, health and safety professionals and academics.31 It 
received 243 written submissions, although one was subsequently withdrawn. Most were 
based on current Australian provisions, and the submissions tended to argue for what the 
submitter has considered to be the best of the current OHS regulatory provisions in the 
Australian OHS statutes. In particular, the State and Territory governments have tended 
to base their submissions on their own provisions. Inevitably, the submissions disclose a 
significant divergence of opinion on key issues – particularly the issue as to whether the 
duty holder or prosecutor should bear the onus of proving whether measures were 
reasonably practicable when there is a prosecution under the general duty provisions; 
whether union officials should have the right to enter workplaces to investigate suspected 
contraventions of the OHS statutes; and whether trade union secretaries should have the 
right to prosecute OHS offences.  The other point that is striking about the submissions 
is that very few, if any, of the submissions are supported by strong evidence. This reflects 
the fact that there has been little funding of empirical OHS regulatory research, and 
governments have not rigorously evaluated the effectiveness of their regulatory standards 
and programs, nor have they collected sufficient data about the impact of these. 
3. The First Report 
The Panel submitted its First Report to the Workplace Relations Ministers Council at the 
end of October 2008.32 The report focused on the priority areas identified in clause 12 of 
the Review’s Terms of Reference, in particular: 
 ‘The duties of care, including the identification of duty holders and the scope and 
limits of duties; 
 The nature and structure of offences, including defences.’ 
The First Report contained just under 180 pages, and was divided into five Parts: the 
regulatory context; the duties of care; the offences relating to the duty of care; other 
matters relevant to duty of care offences; and defences. Notably the Terms of Reference 
only required the Panel to address ‘Definitions’ in the Second Report.  Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
31  National Review into Model Occupational Health and Safety Laws, First Report to the 
Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council, Commonwealth of Australia, October 2008, 4-5. 
32  National Review into Model Occupational Health and Safety Laws, First Report to the 
Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council, Commonwealth of Australia, October 2008, 
(henceforth referred to as the ‘First Report’). 
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nature of the issues in the First Report required the Panel to foreshadow the definitions 
they were to develop for the Second Report. 
The Regulatory Context 
Chapter 1 of the First Report observes that the general Australian OHS statutes are 
based on the recommendations of the British Robens Committee,33 which it describes as 
having two major elements: a single umbrella statute containing broad general duties of 
care based on the common law duty of care; and ‘the incorporation of “self-regulation” 
by empowering duty holders, in consultation with employees, to determine how they will 
comply with the general duties’. 34 This seems to be a very narrow description of the 
British Robens Report, which envisaged two objectives of the OHS regulatory model. 
The first was the streamlining of the state’s role in the traditional regulatory system 
(external state regulation), through the ‘creation of a more unified and integrated 
system’.35 This involved bringing together all of the OHS legislation into one umbrella 
statute, containing broad general duties covering a range of parties affecting workplace 
health and safety, including employers, the self-employed, occupiers, designers, 
manufacturers, and suppliers of plant and substances and employees. The skeletal 
statutory general duties were to be fleshed out with standards in regulations and codes of 
practice. A unified OHS inspectorate was to have new administrative sanctions, 
improvement and prohibition notices, to supplement prosecution. Prosecutions were to 
be brought against corporate officers, as well as against the corporate employer. The 
second objective, recognising the practical limitations of external state regulation, was the 
creation of ‘a more effectively self-regulating system’.36 In the Robens vision, self-
regulation involves workers and management, at workplace level, working together to 
achieve, and improve upon, the OHS standards specified by the state: arguably a larger 
vision than mere self-determination on general duty compliance.   
 
The First Report also notes that in the past decade each of the Australian general OHS 
statutes has been reviewed, and that these reviews have addressed many of the issues that 
                                                 
33  Robens Report, above n 3. 
34  First Report, above n 32, p 2. 
35   Robens Report, above n 3, para 41. 
36   Ibid. 
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were of concern to the Panel.37 The Panel acknowledged that the reviews were useful 
sources of information and analysis.38 
 
Chapter 2 of the First Report outlines at length the significant changes that have taken 
place in the Australian labour market and in the nature and organisation of work in the 
past 20 years, and in particular the growth in casual, part-time and temporary work, and 
the increased use of labour hire, outsourcing, franchising, migrant workers and home 
workers. The chapter notes that there is now significant evidence showing that these new 
forms of work have an adverse impact on OHS, and that regulatory frameworks are 
having difficulty addressing these issues.  Further, changes in work relationships and in 
industry structure will continually lead to changes in the kinds of hazards and risks at 
work. The chapter also observes that nearly 96 per cent of private sector businesses were 
small businesses (with fewer than 20 employees). Only 0.3 per cent of Australian 
businesses employ more than 200 workers. Finally, trade union membership has been 
falling (to 19 percent in 2007, compared with 46 percent in 1986). It is worth noting that 
the First Report does not discuss the trends in employers’ membership of employer 
associations, an issue of considerable significance for analyses of the possibility of 
employer associations providing compliance support to employers.39  
Chapter 3 analyses Australia’s OHS performance and concludes that in the past decade 
there has been a gradual reduction in both the number and incidence rate of 
compensated work-related injuries and fatalities.  Of course, these statistics must be 
treated with caution because, like all compensation statistics, they privilege work-related 
injury over disease. Further, because of the increased percentages of contingent and 
precarious workers, including self-employed contractors and sub-contractors, the 
percentage of workers covered by workers’ compensation systems is likely to be 
declining. In any event, the First Report remarked that the number of Australian workers 
killed and injured at work is still unacceptably high. The significant point to emerge from 
chapters 2 and 3 is that the ‘Model Act should be designed so that it is capable of 
accommodating such new and evolving circumstances, without requiring amendments as 
these changes occur’,40 and that: 
                                                 
37  First Report, above n 32, p 2. 
38    Ibid, xiii. 
39  This issue will be addressed in the Second Report. 
40  First Report, above n 32, 7. 
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OHS legislation must have a wide coverage, so that it applies to all hazards and risks 
arising from the conduct of work and imposes appropriate duties on those who are in a 
position to eliminate the hazards or control the risks.41  
The Duties of Care 
At the beginning of Chapter 4, the Panel specifies that: 
In making our recommendations, we are concerned that the model Act provides for: 
 as broad a coverage as possible, to ensure that the duties of care deal with emerging 
and future hazards and risks and changes to work and work arrangements; 
 clarity of expression, to ensure certainty in the identification of the duty holders and 
that they can understand the obligations placed on them; and 
 the interpretation and application of the duties of care consistent with the protection 
of health and safety.42 
The Panel recommended that the model Act should contain a set of principles to guide 
duty holders, regulators and the courts in the interpretation of the duties of care, and 
that, inter alia, the principles should include the following:43 
(a) Duties of care are imposed upon those who are involved in, materially affect, or are 
materially affected by, the performance of work; 
(b) All duty holders (other than workers, officers and others at the workplace) must 
eliminate or reduce hazards or risks so far as is reasonably practicable; 
(c) Workers and other individuals at the workplace must co-operate with persons 
conducting businesses or undertakings at the workplace, to assist in the achievement of 
the objective of elimination or reduction of hazards or risks and must take reasonable care 
for themselves and others; 
(d) Officers must proactively take steps to ensure the objective of elimination or reduction of 
hazards or risks is achieved within their organisation.’ 
Further, the principles of risk management should be identified in the part of the Model 
Act setting out the fundamental principles applicable to the model Act.44 
Of interest is use of the words ‘reduce’ and ‘reduction’ in the Panel’s statement of 
principles. Substituting the words ‘minimise’ and ‘minimisation’ would to indicate the 
extent to which duty holders should strive to address hazards and risks.45 Hopefully this 
                                                 
41  Ibid, xiii. 
42  Ibid, 18. 
43   Ibid,  Recommendation 2. 
44  Ibid, Recommendation 9. 
45  I address this issue further in the section below on ‘reasonably practicable’. 
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will be rectified by the WRMC or Safe Work Australia when they address the 
recommendations in the First Report.  
Much of the First Report addresses the general duty provisions. Following on from the 
analysis of the changing organisation of work in Chapter 2, one of the Panel’s 
overarching recommendations is that the duty of care provisions in the model Act 
‘together impose duties on all persons who by their conduct may cause, or contribute in a 
specified way, to risks to the health and safety of any person from the conduct of a 
business or undertaking.’46 Another is that the duties of care are to be ‘focused on the 
undertaking of work and activities that contribute to its being done, and are not limited 
to the workplace’. 47  
These two recommendations are operationalised by arguably the most important 
proposals in the First Report: that the model Act impose a ‘primary’ general duty upon a 
‘person conducting a business or an undertaking’ and owed to ‘workers’ broadly defined 
and ‘others’; and that beneath this primary duty sits a series of specific classes of duty 
holders with more detailed duties which ‘flesh out’ the primary duty of care, without 
excluding or limiting the primary duty. The primary and specific duties are all qualified by 
the ‘reasonable practicability’ of measures to eliminate or reduce48 hazards and risks, and 
reasonable practicability is to be included in each duty of care, with the onus of proving 
reasonable practicability in a prosecution being on the prosecutor. Workers and 
corporate officers are not subject to the primary duty of care, but have other specific 
duties imposed upon them, which are qualified by reasonable care and due diligence 
respectively.49  The Panel recommends that the model Act include key principles to be 
found in the current OHS statutes: that the general duties are non-delegable; that a 
person can have more than one duty; that more than one person can concurrently owe 
the same duty; that no duty restricts another; and that each duty holder must comply 
with an applicable duty to the required standard (reasonably practicable, reasonable care 
or due diligence) even though another duty holder may have the same duty.50 The Panel 
recommends that ‘each duty holder must consult, and co-operate and co-ordinate 
                                                 
46  First Report, above n 32, Recommendation 3. 
47  Ibid, Recommendation 3. 
48  See again the criticism of this word instead of the word ‘minimise’, above. 
49  First Report, above n 32, chapters 8 and 9. 
50  Ibid, Recommendations 2(a), (b), (c) and (d). 
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activities with all persons having a duty in relation to the same matter.’51 The Panel also 
specifies that the model Act will contain a provision to the effect that: ‘(e) Each duty 
holder must comply with an applicable duty to the extent to which the duty holder has 
control over relevant matters, or would have control if not for an agreement or 
arrangement purporting to limit or remove that control.’ 52 It is not clear exactly what this 
means, but hopefully it means that duty holders cannot contract out of their OHS 
obligations. Certainly the drafters of the model OHS should make it clear that this is the 
intended meaning of the provision. 
The primary duty 
The Panel is to be strongly commended for its recommendation that the primary general 
duty in the model Act be owed by a ‘person conducting a business or an undertaking’,53 
but should not be owed by workers and officers to the extent that they were not 
conducting a business or undertaking in their own right. 54  This recommendation builds 
on the general duty on persons conducting a business or undertaking in section 28 of the 
Queensland Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (similar provisions are to be found in the 
new Work Safety Act 2008 (ACT) and the new Workplace Health and Safety Act 2007 (NT)), 
but goes further to recommend that this duty be an overarching or umbrella duty, 
purporting to impose OHS obligations on all persons who are in a position to eliminate 
or control all work-related hazards and risks. As noted later in this article, this primary 
duty will be supplemented by specific duty holders having particular duties, and by 
regulations, codes of practice and guidance material. 
The Panel considered that the current approach of imposing the duty upon an employer 
and upon a self-employed person ‘is too limited, as it maintains the link to the 
employment relationship as a determinant of the duty of care’ and ‘the changing nature 
of work arrangements and relationships make this link no longer sufficient to protect all 
persons engaged in work activities.’55 The Panel noted that there may be circumstances 
where a person with active control or influence over the way work is conducted might be 
neither an employer nor a self-employed person.56 Further, the person carrying out the 
                                                 
51  Ibid, Recommendation 2(f). 
52  Ibid, Recommendation 2(e). 
53  Ibid, Recommendation 13. 
54  Ibid, Recommendations 10, 11, 12 and 13. 
55   Ibid, 46. 
56  Ibid, 46. 
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work might be doing so under the effective direction or influence of a person who is not 
a person engaging them under a contract of employment: for example, the worker may 
be a contractor, or may be share farming or share fishing.57 The Panel recommended that 
the primary duty holder’s obligations should not be limited to the employment 
relationship58 and went further to argue that those obligations should not be limited to 
any particular relationships.59  
While the Panel will define ‘conduct of a business or undertaking’ in the Second Report, 
it indicated that the primary duty of care should clearly provide that it applies to any 
person conducting a business or undertaking whether as (a) an employer; (b) a self-
employed person; or (c) the Crown in any capacity; and (d) a person in any other 
capacity, and whether or not the business or undertaking is conducted for gain or 
reward.60 It indicated that its preference was to define ‘business’ along the lines of the 
definition in the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld) section 28(3) and Workplace 
Health and Safety Act 2007 (NT), section 4. Section 28(3) of the Queensland Act provides 
that the general duty imposed on a person who conducts a business or undertaking 
applies --  
(a) whether or not the relevant person conducts the business or undertaking as an employer, 
self-employed person or otherwise; and  
(b) whether or not the business or undertaking is conducted for gain or reward; and  
(c) whether or not a person works on a voluntary basis.  
 
Section 4 of the Northern Territory Act defines ‘business’ as ‘(a) an industrial or 
commercial undertaking or activity (whether carried on for profit or on a not-for-profit 
basis); or (b) an undertaking or activity of government or local government’. 
The primary duty is to be owed to ‘workers’ very broadly defined, and to others. While 
the Panel will address the definition of ‘worker’ in the Second Report, it indicated61 that 
its preferred approach will be based on the definition of ‘worker’ in the Northern 
Territory Act (section 4),62 which includes ‘any person who works in a person’s business 
or undertaking’ as an employee, apprentice, contractor or sub-contractor (or their 
employee), employee of a labour hire company, volunteer or in any other capacity’. 
                                                 
57  Ibid, 47. See the other examples at the bottom of page 47. 
58   Ibid, Recommendation 11. 
59  Ibid, 48. 
60  Ibid, Recommendation 12. 
61  Ibid, Recommendation 16. 
62  See also the definition in section 9 of the Work Safety Act 2008 (ACT). 
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The Panel recommended that the primary duty of care should not be limited to the 
workplace (in contrast to section 8(2) and 9 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 
(NSW)), but ‘should apply to any work activity and work consequences, wherever they 
may occur, resulting from the conduct of the business or undertaking.’63 To avoid the 
limitation or exclusion of the primary duty of care, the Panel recommended that the 
Model Act ‘specifically provide that the duty should apply without limitation’, and in 
particular should not be limited or restricted by the specific duties.64 
The Panel illustrated how the primary duty could be drawn together in a model clause, as 
follows:65 
1. A person conducting a business or undertaking (other than in the capacity of a worker or 
officer) must ensure so far as is reasonably practicable that workers engaged in work as 
part of the business or undertaking, and any other persons, are not exposed to a risk to 
their health and safety from the conduct of the business or undertaking. 
2. Without limiting sub-section (1), a person conducting a business or undertaking must so 
far as is reasonably practicable ensure: 
(a) the provision and maintenance of plant and systems of work as are necessary for the 
work to be performed without risk to the health and safety of any person; 
(b) the provision and maintenance of arrangements for the safe use, handling, storage 
and transport of plant and substances; 
(c) each workplace under the control and management of the business operator is 
maintained in a condition that is safe and without risks to health; 
(d) the provision of adequate welfare facilities; 
(e) the provision of such information, training, instruction and supervision as necessary 
to protect all persons from risks to their health and safety from the conduct of the 
business or undertaking …’ 
          ….. 
4. In this section [provide definitions of worker, business or undertaking etc]. 
       5.  For the avoidance of doubt, the duties and obligations imposed by this section apply 
without limitation notwithstanding anything provided elsewhere in the Act. 
Sub-section (3) provides for the extension of the primary duty of care to circumstances 
where the primary duty holder, ‘a person who conducts a business or undertaking’, 
                                                 
63  First Report, above n 32, Recommendation 17. For a good example, see Whittaker v Delmina 
Pty Ltd  (1998) 87 IR 268. 
64  First Report, above n 32, Recommendation18. 
65  Ibid, 59 and Recommendation 21. 
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provides accommodation to workers in remote locations to enable the worker to 
undertake the work.66 
The expression in sub-section (1) of the model clause ‘are not exposed to a risk to their 
health and safety’ has been interpreted very broadly by the courts. The best known 
example is the English case of R v Board of Trustees of the Science Museum [1993] ICR 876, 
where the Court of Appeal stated that the ordinary meaning of ‘the word “risks” conveys 
the idea of a possibility of danger,  … The word “exposed” simply makes it clear that the 
section is concerned with persons potentially affected by the risks.’ In other words, for a 
contravention of the primary duty to occur the person owed the duty does not actually 
have to suffer injury or ill-health, but rather need only be exposed to a significant risk of 
injury or ill-health. 
Sub-section (2) in the model clause expressly provides that it does not limit subsection 
(1), and places the particular duties on any person conducting a business or 
undertaking.67 It is largely a cut and paste of the specific obligations to be found under 
the employer’s general duty in the current OHS statutes.68 Presumably these specific 
obligations will be supplemented somewhere in the model Act with a provision requiring 
the primary duty holder to ‘consult, and co-operate and co-ordinate activities with all 
persons having a duty in relation to the same matter.’69 
There are serious concerns with the old fashioned nature of recommendations 19 and 20 
leading to subsections (2) and (3) above. Because the provisions in sub-section (2) are 
drawn from the current employer’s general duties to employees, and the provisions in 
sub-section (3) from the employer’s duty in Western Australia, they outline obligations 
that are framed for the employment relationship, and not for other work relationships or 
for other types of relationship, and which are less clearly the primary issues that should 
be emphasised in other situations – for example, where the protection of members of the 
public is of concern. In other words, they highlight plant, substances, workplace 
conditions, accommodation and first aid at the expense of other types of risk (which, of 
course, are generically covered by sub-section (1)) and fail to address core processes in a 
systematic (but not systems) approach to managing OHS. This is, arguably,  a retrograde 
                                                 
66   Ibid, Recommendation 20.  
67  Ibid, 57. It deals with a particular situation that has been highlighted by experience in 
remote areas in Western Australia. 
68   Ibid, Recommendation 19 and see p 57. 
69  Ibid, Recommendation 2(f). These issues will be addressed in the Second Report. 
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step and misses an ideal opportunity to reinforce in duty holders’ minds the notion that 
there are proactive steps they should take to pursue positive OHS outcomes which 
include appointment of competent persons, consultation with workers, searching for and 
eliminating or minimising risks, developing and implementing safe systems of work, 
providing instruction and training, monitoring injuries and adverse health effects, 
reporting and investigating incidents and taking preventive action, arranging and 
providing first aid, emergency response and documenting action taken. These are core 
activities in any proactive approach to OHS and are uncontroversial, except perhaps the 
requirement to engage OHS expertise.  
 
My understanding from communications with the National OHS Review Panel is that in 
the First Report the Panel has addressed the duties of care as outcomes to be achieved. 
Process matters which support the duties of care will be addressed in the Second Report. 
The Panel considers that these are fundamental to the duties of care, but are not part of 
the duty ‘of care’. These matters will include consultation, issue resolution, employment 
or engagement of OHS advice, and may include risk management requirements.   
 
The above discussion begs the question as to whether there should be a specific duty 
owed by a person conducting a business or an undertaking to workers, which includes 
the matters outlined in the second half of the previous paragraph. An alternative 
approach would be to use regulations, codes of practice and guidance material to provide 
this detail. Recommendation 22 specifies that ‘the primary duty of care should be 
supported by codes of practice or guidance material to explain the scope of its operation 
and what is needed to comply with the duty.’ Presumably this recommendation should 
also include regulations, as the text which supports it refers to the use of regulations as 
well as codes of practice and guidance material.  
 
The First Report notes that in some industries regulations or statutes unrelated to the 
general OHS statute impose OHS obligations on business operators in that industry.70 
The most notable examples are in the mining industry, the road transport industry, and 
also in relation to clothing outworkers. The First Report considers that these sorts of 
detailed obligations are not appropriate for inclusion in the model Act and should be 
                                                 
70  Ibid, 60. 
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addressed in regulations, codes and guidance material. The issue of whether there should 
be industry specific legislation will be considered in the Second Report. 
 
I would argue that the model OHS Act include, in the part of the Act dealing with the 
primary duty of care, examples of the type of work arrangements that the duty address – 
all kinds of labour hire arrangements, franchise arrangements, contracting and sub-
contracting, share farming and fishing, and so on. One option is for these examples to be 
provided in Second Report when the Panel addresses definitions.71 Further, the first 
round of new regulations, codes and guidance material made under the model OHS Act 
should also clearly outline how the primary duty applies to these various working 
arrangements. 
 
The specific classes of duty holders 
As noted at the beginning of this paper, the modern Australian OHS statutes impose 
general duties on a variety of parties other than the employer and self-employed persons. 
The First Report recasts these general duties as specific duties which further clarify the 
primary general duty in relation to specific classes of duty holders, namely:72 
 those in the management and control of the workplace and adjacent areas, 
fixtures, fittings or plant; 
 the so-called ‘upstream duty holders’, such as designers, manufacturers, suppliers 
and importers of plant, substances and structures, as well as builders, erectors 
and installers of structures; and 
 OHS service providers. 
The First Report proposes a specific duty on those who have, to any extent,73 
management and control74 of the workplace,75 fixtures, fittings or plant within it to 
                                                 
71      Note that there are specific references to labour hire and franchising at p 50 of the First 
Report. 
72   First Report, above n 32, 61. 
73        Ibid, Recommendation 25 
74  This will be defined in the Second Report. 
75      The Panel recommends that, for this specific duty, domestic premises be excluded from the 
definition of a workplace unless specifically included by a regulation: First Report, above n 
32, Recommendation 28. 
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ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, 76 that the workplace, the means of entering 
and existing the workplace, and any fixtures, fittings and plant within it are safe and 
without risks to health and safety77 of any person at the workplace or any adjacent areas.78 
All of the current Australian OHS statutes impose a duty on upstream duty holders, but 
the provisions vary in their coverage and the nature of the duty. The National OHS 
Review Panel has proposed that the model OHS Act provide for separate duties of care 
to be owed by ‘specific class of persons undertaking activities’ in relation to plant, 
substances or structures intended for use at work.79  The specific classes of persons are 
designers of plant, substances and structures; manufacturers of plant, substances and 
structures; builders, erectors and installers of structures; suppliers80 and importers of 
plant, substances and structures.81 The Report also recommends that the duties should 
cover the life cycle of activities to be undertaken in relation to the plant, substance or 
structure. 82  The duties would ‘ensure that the health and safety of those contributing to 
the use of, using, otherwise dealing with or affected by the use of plant, structures or 
substances is not put at risk’ from the particular activities of construction, erection, 
installation, building, commissioning, inspection, storage, transport, operating, 
assembling, cleaning, maintenance or repair, decommissioning, disposal, dismantling and 
recycling.83 The duty is owed to those persons using or otherwise dealing with, or whose 
health and safety might otherwise be affected by the use of the plant, substance or 
structure.84 It is also recommended that the specific duties include broad requirements for 
hazard identification, risk assessment and control; appropriate testing and examination to 
identify any hazards and risks; the provision of information to the person to whom the 
plant, structure or substance is provided about the hazards, risks and risk control 
measures; and the ongoing provision of any additional information as it becomes 
available.85 
 
                                                 
76   Ibid, Recommendation 27. 
77   Ibid, Recommendation 23. 
78   Ibid, Recommendation 26. 
79
 ` Ibid, Recommendation 29. 
80  ‘Supply’ will be defined in the Second Report, but the Panel recommends that passive 
financiers (persons who technically  own plant, structures or substances for which they are 
providing finance) be excluded from the definition of ‘supply’: Ibid,  Recommendation 36. 
81  Ibid, Recommendation 30. 
82  Ibid, 70-72. 
83  Ibid, Recommendation 31. 
84   Ibid, Recommendation 33. 
85  Ibid, Recommendation 34. 
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These recommendations can be cautiously supported as they emphasise the role of 
upstream duty holders and a life cycle approach, although the Report does not make it 
clear how differentiated the duties would be. For example, would there be a separate duty 
for each function and type of item? That would mean 15 different duties. The Report 
notes concern about the complexity of expressing duties separately in this way,86 but does 
not make it clear how the specific duties would be drafted. While the Report appears to 
suggest separate duties but may simply be intending a separate duty from the principal 
duty of persons conducting a business or undertaking. 87 
 
Recommendation 32 attempts to deal with the thorny issue of unintended use or misuse, 
proposing that consideration should be given to any reasonably foreseeable activity 
undertaken for the purpose for which the item was intended to be used. This proposal is 
an attempt to balance potential duty holder concerns that they should not have to 
consider all possible ways persons may misuse their items, with the position that duty 
holders should not simply be able to declare that their item must be used safely. It is not 
clear that this recommendation would resolve the uncertainty about unintended use. For 
example, in the Arbor Products88 case the supplier of a wood chipper claimed the plant was 
not used for the purpose for which it was intended. It had been used to mulch different 
types of materials, not wood. The Full Bench, on appeal, found that the statutory duty 
required that plant was supplied in a safe condition, in the sense that its safety was 
ensured,89 and that the qualification of proper usage was intended to limit liability where 
the plant was safe but became unsafe because of misuse.90 An approach that emphasises 
identification of reasonably foreseeable hazards, and eliminating or minimising risks so 
far as reasonably practicable would overcome these problems. Further, the definitions in 
the Second Report might address the issue of the definition of ‘purpose’, and in 
particular, the breadth or detail of the definition of that word.   
 
A surprising recommendation in the First Report is the specific duty placed on people or 
organisations who provide information, advice or OHS services to workplaces, on the 
basis that these people, by providing such services, ‘materially influence health and safety 
                                                 
86  Ibid, 69-70. 
87  Ibid, 70. 
88  WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Mulder) v Arbor Products International 
(Australia) Pty Ltd [2001] NSWIRComm 50. 
89  Ibid, para 43. 
90  Ibid, para 43. 
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by directing or influencing things done or provided for health and safety.’91 The Panel 
recommends that the model Act should place ‘a duty of care’ on any person providing 
OHS advice, services or products92 that are relied upon by other duty holders to comply 
with their obligations under the model Act.’93 The Panel was influenced by a similar 
provision in the Tasmanian OHS legislation.94 The duty should require the service 
provider to ensure so far as is reasonably practicable that no person at work is exposed 
to risks to their health or safety from the provision of services. 95 
 
The First Report includes this duty on OHS service providers but does not make any 
recommendation for inclusion of OHS support in the proposed duty of a person 
conducting a business or undertaking. It is difficult to see how duty holders can take the 
necessary steps to comply with the complex OHS duties outlined above if they do not 
ensure that they have employed or engaged personnel with expertise in OHS. While 
some duty holders will do this voluntarily, it is difficult to see why such a crucial aspect 
of a general duty – to engage personnel with the requisite OHS expertise – is not 
included in the specific aspects of the general duty anywhere in the First Report.  A 
consequence is that the obligations of a duty holder fall below the current requirements 
in the Victorian Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004, section 22(2)(b) and in the New 
South Wales Occupational Health and Safety Regulation 2001, regulation 16. The Panel intend 
to make recommendations for provision of OHS support or services in their Second 
Report. Provision for OHS support is essential to ensure organisations have OHS 
knowledge and capability. 
 
Further, there is cause for serious concern with the First Report’s recommendation that 
there be a duty on the providers of OHS services. The proposed duty is premised on the 
assumption that providers of OHS services materially influence health or safety by 
directing or influencing things done or provided for health or safety. Providers of OHS 
                                                 
91  First Report, above n 32, 76. 
92  What are relevant ‘services’ and who the relevant ‘service providers’ are will be defined in 
the Second Report.  The Panel suggested, however, that the definition of ‘service 
providers’ might include a health and safety organisation, consultants providing advice or 
intellectual property, training providers, lawyers, occupational hygienists or others 
undertaking environmental or biological testing or analysis; or any person or entity 
claiming an expertise in OHS and providing a service to a business or undertaking: Ibid, 
77. 
93  Ibid, Recommendation 37. 
94  Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Tas), s.14B. 
95  First Report, above n 32, Recommendation 39. 
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services do so either as employees of, typically, larger organisations with sufficient 
resources or as independent contractors. Either way, they are not in a position to direct or 
ensure OHS outcomes which are determined by officers of an organisation, unless they 
are actually appointed in a senior and influential management position. It is 
disproportionate to impose a duty on OHS service providers to ensure health and safety, 
even if qualified by reasonably practicability. An appropriate level of responsibility is to 
require OHS service providers to take reasonable care to ensure persons are not adversely 
affected by their conduct or omissions. The Victorian Code of Ethics and Minimum Service 
Standards for Professional Members of OHS Associations (developed by OHS professional 
associations collaborating with WorkSafe Victoria) is an appropriate approach 
emphasising that the responsibility of OHS service providers is to act and work 
responsibly, competently and honestly, and giving priority to OHS over sectional or 
private interests.96 It is likely that the definitions in the Second Report will make it clear 
that the specific duties, including this duty, do not apply to workers and officers, in the 
same way as they are excluded from the primary duty.  Thus, an employee providing 
OHS advice as an employee within a business that is engaged to do so would not be 




As noted earlier in this article, all of the duties discussed so far in this section are to be 
qualified by reasonable practicability. The Panel recommends that this expression be 
defined in the model Act, 97 in a way ‘which allows a duty holder to understand what is 
required to meet the standard.’ 98 In particular, the First Report makes the important 
point that the definition should specify that the duty holder must not just have regard to, 
but also weigh up the various elements of the calculus.99 The Panel outlined an example 
definition as follows: 
 
                                                 
96  Victorian Code of Ethics and Minimum Service Standards for Professional Members of OHS 
Associations, 1st ed, Health and Safety Professionals Alliance, Melbourne, 2008, 4. 
97  First Report, above n 32, Recommendation 5. 
98  Ibid, Recommendation 6. 
99   Ibid, 34. See in particular, the example of the wording provided by the Panel on pages 34-
35. 
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‘Reasonably practicable means (except in relation to obligations for consultation) that which 
is, or was, at a particular time reasonably able to be done in relation to ensuring health and 
safety, taking into account and weighing up all relevant matters, including: 
a) the likelihood of the hazard or risk eventuating; 
b) the degree of harm that may result if the hazard or risk eventuated; 
c) what the duty holder knows, or a person in their position ought reasonably to know, 
about: 
(i) the hazard, the potential harm and the risk; 
(ii)  ways of eliminating or reducing the hazard, the harm or the risk; 
d) the availability and suitability of ways to eliminate or reduce the hazard, the harm and the 
risk; and 
e) the costs associated with the available ways of eliminating or reducing the hazard, the 
harm or the risk, including whether the cost is grossly disproportionate to the degree of 
harm and the risk. 
 
The Panel also recommended that the meaning and application of the standard of 
reasonably practicable should be explained in a code of practice or guidance material.100  
 
This ‘example definition’ is based upon, and improves, the best definition of ‘reasonably 
practicable’ in the current OHS statutes, namely section 20 of the Occupational Health and 
Safety Act 2004 (Vic). This definition can be further improved when considered in the 
Second Report, in at least three aspects.101  First, while it uses the term ‘costs’ in 
paragraph (e) (rather than ‘cost’ in section 20 of the Victorian Act) and is not meant to 
be read narrowly, the reference to ‘cost’ later in the clause should be phrased so that it 
refers not only to monetary costs, but to other costs as well.  
 
Second, the clause should emphasise that measures are only not reasonably practicable if 
the time, trouble and cost involved in their introduction are grossly disproportionate to 
the risk.102 The definition should be revised to reflect the principle that costs, time and 
trouble are quarantined and only taken into account in determining whether the measures 
are disproportionate. This approach would recognise that where the risk is low and there 
                                                 
100  Ibid, Recommendation 7. The Panel gave as an example of guidance material the excellent 
publication, WorkSafe Victoria, How WorkSafe Applies the Law in Relation to Reasonably 
Practicable, WorkSafe Position, Edition No. 1, WorkSafe Victoria, Melbourne, 2007 
101  This and the following two paragraphs have benefited significantly from an exchange with 
the National OHS Review Panel. 
102  See Asquith LJ in Edwards v National Coal Board [1949] 1 KB 704 at 712. 
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are a range of possible controls, each minimising the likelihood or degree of harm to the 
same extent, the duty holder may choose the least costly option. This principle could also 
be emphasised in the definition of reasonably practicable. 
 
Third, there is a very strong argument that the expression should be eliminate or minimise 
risks to emphasise the need to achieve the lowest possible risk. It is true that the 
Australian OHS Acts and regulations around Australia use both the terms ‘reduce’ (for 
example, in the definition of ‘reasonably practicable in section 20 of the Victorian OHS 
Act, and see also regulation 3.1 in the Occupational Safety and Health Regulations 1996 in 
Western Australia) and ‘minimise’ (see, for example, section 27A of the Workplace Health 
and Safety Act 1995 (Qld) and section 55 of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 2007 (NT)). 
It may also be that the qualifier of ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’ effectively results in 
‘reduce’ and ‘minimise’ meaning the same thing.  Even so, the drafters of the National 
OHS Act would be well advised to use the expression ‘minimise’ to make the matter 
clear. 
 
The Panel recommended that the concept of control not be included in the definition of 
reasonable practicability103 because ‘control is an inherent element in determining what 
can reasonably be done in the circumstances. Making express reference to control in the 
definition of reasonably practicable may lead to a focus on that issue, ahead of other 
factors noted in the definition.’104  
 
The Panel also addressed the issue of whether reasonably practicable should explicitly 
refer to risk management principles. Both the reasonably practicable and risk 
management principles appear to require duty holders to identify and weigh up risks and 
possible control measures, but it is far from clear from a simple reading of the OHS 
statutes exactly what the relationship between these two processes is. This apparent 
disjunction between reasonably practicable and risk management principles reflects the 
distinct origins of each. The reasonably practicable calculus emerged as a crucial 
qualification to the general duty provisions in Anglo-Australian OHS legislation which 
emerged from the 1970s in response to the Robens Report, while the central place of risk 
management principles in OHS regulation emerged in the next wave of the OHS 
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regulatory debate beginning in the 1980s – and these risk management principles were 
placed in the regulations and codes of practice made under the OHS Acts.105 It should be 
noted at this point that the cases interpreting the employer’s general duty indicate that 
the employer should not just be responding to demonstrated risks but should have a 
system of searching for and identifying all possible risks, and instituting reasonable and 
appropriate measures.106   
 
The Panel recommended that the principles of risk management should be identified in 
the part of the model Act setting out the fundamental principles, but that risk 
management should not expressly be required to be applied as part of the qualifier 
reasonably practicable, or to comply with the duties of care.107 The Panel explained that it 
considered that: 
The definition of reasonably practicable should be simple and easy to understand, setting 
out principles rather than processes. Reasonably practicable should be a standard to be 
met, rather than a process. If it is appropriate for risk management process requirements 
to be included in the model Act, they can be provided in separate provisions as specific 
obligations. This is consistent with the principles in our terms of reference.108 
 
Whether risk management principles should be further recognised and reinforced in the 
model OHS Act, and whether or not there should be specific requirements for risk 
management will be addressed in the Second Report. 
 
If risk management is not expressly required to comply with the general duties of care, or 
to determine what preventive action is reasonably practicable, duty holders will be left in 
the curious position of being required by case law to assess the risks without this being 
explicitly required by the model Act. Further, the First Report seems to take different 
approaches to the risk management requirement. As noted above, it proposes that risk 
management should be included in fundamental principles to support interpretation and 
implementation and not as part of reasonably practicable, and then proposes that the 
upstream duties should include risk management. There is no justification for these 
different approaches. If risk management is not integrated in all of the duties, replacing 
reasonably practicable, then it should be dealt with consistently in fundamental principles 
that apply to all duties. Different approaches simply cause confusion and there is no basis 
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for expecting that upstream duty holders will be any better at risk assessment than other 
duty holders.  
 
Duties of officers 
 
A corporation is an artificial entity, and can only operate through its human agents – 
including its corporate officers and workers. The Australian OHS statutes currently make 
provision for corporate officer liability for contraventions by the corporation of the 
statutory OHS obligations, but there are at least four different models for doing this.109 
For example, section 26 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW) provides 
that: 
 
(1) If a corporation contravenes, whether by act or omission, any provision of this Act or 
the regulations, each individual director of the corporation, and each person concerned 
in the management of the corporation, is taken to have contravened the same provision 
unless the director or manager satisfies the court that: 
(a) he or she was not in a position to influence the conduct of the corporation in 
relation to its contravention of the provision; or 
(b) he or she, being in such a position, used all due diligence to prevent the 
contravention by the corporation. 
 
A second approach to corporate officer liability is found in section 55 (1) of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984 (WA) (see also section 37 of the Health and Safety etc 
at Work Act 1974 (UK)) which provides that: 
Where an offence against the Act committed by a body corporate is proved to have been 
committed with the consent or connivance of, or to have been attributable to any wilful neglect on 
the part of any director, manager, secretary or officer of the body corporate, that person is also 
guilty of that offence. 
 
The Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic) provides, in section 144, that the 
corporate officer will be liable if the corporate employer’s contravention ‘is attributable 
to an officer of the body corporate failing to take reasonable care’ to prevent the 
contravention.   
 
The Review Panel has rejected each of these models, which rely on attributed liability 
rather than imposing a positive duty on corporate officers, breach of which will result in 
an offence by the officer. Instead the panel has recommended the approach set out in 
the Victorian Maxwell Report of 2003, namely that the model Act should place a 
‘positive duty on an officer to exercise due diligence to ensure the compliance by the 
entity of which they are an officer with the duties of care of that entity under the model 
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Act.’110 Note that the standard here is not reasonable practicability, but rather due 
diligence, which is a standard ‘well known by those who would be sufficiently directing 
and influencing the decisions of the company’.111 The Panel noted that corporate officers 
will be defined in the Second Report, but ‘should be those persons who act for, influence 
or make decisions for the management of the relevant company.’112 The officer’s liability 
provision should apply to officers of a corporation, an unincorporated association, a 
partnership and equivalent persons representing the Crown.113 The Panel should ensure 
that the definition of corporate officers in the Second Report is broad enough to include 
‘shadow directors’, so that responsibility for contraventions by corporations of the 
general duties in the model Act can be sheeted home to entities such as holding 
companies and franchisors.114 
 
Duties of workers and others 
 
As noted above, the Panel has recommended a very wide definition of worker. The First 
Report recommends that workers should have a duty of care to themselves and to any 
other person whose health and safety may be affected by the worker’s conduct or 
omissions at work.115 The standard is not reasonable practicability, but rather one of 
reasonable care ‘being the standard applied for negligence under the criminal law’.116 This 
duty will also require workers to co-operate with any reasonable action taken by the 
person conducting the business or undertaking in complying with the model Act.117 The 
First Report also recommends that there should be a similar duty on other persons 
present at the workplace; for example, visitors.118 
 
The Nature of OHS Offences 
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Part 3 of the First Report discusses the nature and structure of offences relating to the 
duties of care. This Part begins with two very important recommendations. The first is 
that to emphasise the seriousness of contraventions of the general duties, and ‘to 
strengthen their deterrent value, breaches of the duties of care should only be criminal 
offences, with the prosecution bearing the criminal standard of proof for all elements of 
the offence.’119 The Panel will address the issue of whether civil sanctions are suitable for 
other obligations in the model Act in the Second Report. The second very important 
recommendation recognises the inchoate nature of OHS offences. As the Review Panel 
notes, a ‘duty holder’s failure to provide and maintain a safe system of work, even where 
no harm has occurred, may result in extreme levels of risk and merit the strongest 
possible sanctions.’120 Thus the Panel recommends that ‘penalties should be clearly 
related to non-compliance with a duty, the culpability of the offender and the level of the 
risk, not merely the actual consequences of the breach.’121 
 
The First Report recommends that offences for contraventions of the duty of care 
should continue to be absolute offences, and be clearly expressed as such, qualified by 
reasonable practicability (or due diligence or reasonable care) as discussed above.122  One 
of the most controversial issues faced by the Review Panel was whether the onus of 
proving reasonable practicability should be borne by the prosecutor (as is the position in 
all of the Australian OHS statutes apart from New South Wales and Queensland), or by 
the duty holder once the prosecutor had proved the other elements of the general duty 
offence (the position in New South Wales, Queensland and in the Health and Safety at 
Work Act 1974 (UK)). The latter position had been supported by the Industry 
Commission in its 1995 report, Work, Health and Safety, a position justified by the 
argument that: 
It is more efficient for the holder of the duty of care rather than the prosecution to have to 
establish what was reasonably practicable. A duty holder could e expected to know more 
about the costs and benefits of the various alternatives open to him or her at any time, 
than anyone else.123 
  
After considering all the arguments, the Review Panel decided that the prosecution 
should bear the onus of proving beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the general 
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duty offence. It observed that the submissions and recent OHS reviews were vehemently 
divided on this issue.124 Factors which appeared to support the Panel’s conclusion 
included the fundamental principle in the criminal justice system that the prosecutor bear 
the onus of proving all of the elements of the offence; and that the High Court in Chugg v 
Pacific Dunlop Limited (1990) CLR 249 held that the onus of proving reasonable 
practicability lay with the prosecutor because OHS inspectors will in all likelihood ‘have 
superior, or at least wider knowledge than an employer on some of the matters which, in 
a good number of cases, will bear upon the question of practicability’125 and that in many 
cases the identification of a hazard or risk ‘may, as a matter of common sense, also 
constitute identification of a means of removing that risk, thereby giving rise to a strong 
inference that an employer failed to provide ‘so far as is practicable’ a safe workplace.’ 126 
The Panel also remarked that it had ‘not been helped in analysing this matter by the 
apparent lack of substantive evidence about the effect of a reverse onus on OHS 
outcomes.’127 It also observed that ‘the instances in which a reverse onus is provided for 
do not usually involve heavy penalties or imprisonment’128 - and as we shall see below, 
the Panel has made such recommendations. 
 
A third important recommendation in the First Report is Recommendation 55: 
 
There should be three categories of offences for each type of duty of care 
a) Category 1 for the most serious breaches, where there was a high level of risk of 
serious harm and the duty holder was reckless or grossly negligent; 
b) Category 2 for circumstances where there was a high level of risk of serious 
harm but without recklessness or gross negligence; and 
c) Category 3 for a breach of the duty without the aggravating factors present in 
the first two categories. 
with maximum penalties that: 
d) relate to the seriousness of the breach in terms of risk and the offender’s 
culpability; 
e) strengthen the deterrent effect of the offences; and 
f) allow the courts to impose more meaningful penalties, where that is appropriate. 
 
This means that in Category 1 offences, the prosecutor has the onus of proving that the 
duty holder was reckless or grossly negligent, rather than that the duty holder failed to 
                                                 
124  First Report, above n 32, 117. 
125  Chugg v Pacific Dunlop Limited (1990) CLR 249, per Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 
para 17. 
126  Ibid at para 18. 
127  First Report, above n 32, 117. 
128  Ibid, 118. 
 34 
take reasonably practicable measures to remove or reduce the risks, and that there was a 
high level of risk of serious harm. 
 
Offences in Category 1 are to be indictable offences (triable summarily where the court 
decides that it is appropriate and the parties agree),129 and the other offences should be 
dealt with summarily.130 
 
One matter not addressed in the First Report is the relationship between the primary 
duty of care and the more specific duties.131  Clearly, the specific classes of duty holders 
will also owe the primary duty of care (and both types of duties are qualified by 
reasonable practicability), so that parties owing the specific duties must also comply with 
the approach required in the primary duty.  Earlier in this article, I noted that to avoid 
the limitation or exclusion of the primary duty of care, the Panel recommended that the 
Model Act ‘specifically provide that the duty should apply without limitation’, and in 
particular should not be limited or restricted by the specific duties.132 This means that 
there can be no suggestion that compliance with the provisions of a specific duty will be 
deemed by the courts to be compliance with the primary duty.   
 
Consequently, it is clear that a breach of a ‘specific duty’ will also constitute a breach of 
the ‘primary duty’, but that there will be circumstances in which there is a contravention 
of the primary duty where there is not an applicable specific duty.  
 
Where a specific duty applies, it is likely that it will be easier to prove a breach of that 
specific duty than a contravention of the primary duty. Thus an OHS regulator would be 
likely to prosecute the breach of the specific duty where it applies, with the primary duty 
called on only where the specific duty cannot be used. 
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It is common in the practice of OHS prosecutors for charges under different provisions 
to be pleaded as alternatives. 133 Where the primary and a specific duty apply, that practice 
appears appropriate. 
  
The current OHS statutes, like the proposed Model OHS Act, provide for a person to be 
subject to a number of duties in relation to the same circumstances and for 
contraventions to be alleged and offences found in relation to them all.  For example, a 
person may be guilty of contraventions of the duty of an employer to employees, the 
duty of the employer to non-employees, and the duty of a person with management or 
control of the workplace.  The general principle in these cases appears to be that where 
two heads of liability arise out of the same fact situation, the issue is to be dealt with at 
the point of sentencing.134  
 
The First Report also recommended that the model Act ensure that more than one 
breach of a duty of care provision could be alleged in a single paragraph of an 
information or count of an indictment in relation to duties of care, thereby avoiding the 
application of the rule against duplicity to charges for contraventions of the general 
duties.135 
Penalties 
The First Report has recommended very high maximum penalties.136 Category 1 offences 
attract a maximum fine of $3,000,000 for corporations, and $600,000 for individuals 
contravening the primary and specific duties; $600,000 for corporate officers; and 
$300,000 for workers. Further, the First Report recommends that the model Act provide 
for imprisonment for individuals for up to five years for category 1 offences.137 
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Category 2 offences attract a maximum fine of $1,500,000 for corporations, and 
$300,000 for individuals contravening the primary and specific duties; $300,000 for 
corporate officers; and $150,000 for workers 
 
Category 3 offences attract a maximum fine of $500,000 for corporations, and $100,000 
for individuals contravening the primary and specific duties; $100,000 for corporate 
officers; and $50,000 for workers. 
 
The Panel noted that the Australian OHS statutes took a variety of approaches to 
offences for contraventions of the OHS statutes leading to workplace fatalities. 138 The 
Panel astutely recognised the dilemma posed by understandable public demands for 
serious punishments to be imposed upon duty holders responsible for contraventions of  
the inchoate duties in the model OHS Act which resulted in a workplace fatality. 
Our approach in dealing with non-compliance with duties of care has been to ensure 
that the statutory responses are consistent with the graduated enforcement of the duties. 
We are concerned that the natural abhorrence felt towards work-related deaths should 
not lead to an inappropriate response. The seriousness of offences and sanctions should 
relate to the culpability of the offender and not solely to the outcome of non-
compliance. Otherwise, egregious, systematic failures to eliminate or control hazards or 
risks might not e adequately addressed. 
 
Even so, where non-compliance with duties of care involve a high degree of negligence 
or recklessness and results or could result in a work-related death or other grievous harm 
to a person to whom a duty is owed, we consider that it is appropriately placed at the 
highest end of the scale of offences.139 
 
In other words, these instances would be dealt with as Category 1 offences, and subject 
to the high penalties for such offences.  
 
The First Report examined the issue of whether these monetary and custodial penalties 
should be supplemented with non-monetary penalties and concluded that, even ‘though 
there was limited information available that demonstrates the long term effects on OHS 
… of alternative sentencing options’, the ‘possible weaknesses of particular sentencing 
options may be reduced or eliminated by the judicious combining of several orders.’140 
Accordingly, the Panel recommended141 that the model Act should provide the following 
sentencing options in addition to fines and custodial orders: 
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a) adverse publicity orders; 
b) remedial orders; 
c) corporate probation 
d) community service orders 
e) injunctions 
f) training orders; and 
g) compensation orders. 
 
The Panel considered that since it was recommending significant increases in maximum 
penalties, and was also proposing a greater range of sentencing options, there was plenty 
of scope for a sentencing court to impose substantial fines that take account of prior 
convictions where to do so is appropriate,142 and the model Act did not need to provide 
for a further penalty for a repeat offender.143 
 
One of the curious aspects of the current Australian OHS statutes is that, apart from the 
maximum penalties specified in the Acts, very little guidance is provided to the 
sentencing court. Such guidance will be even more important once the model Act is 
adopted by each Australian jurisdiction, to ensure that the courts impose consistent 
penalties across jurisdictions. Guidance is also assist courts apply a mix of monetary, 
non-monetary and custodial penalties. The First Report recommended that ‘subject to 
wider criminal justice policy considerations’, the model Act should provide for the 
‘promulgation of sentencing guidelines or, where there are applicable sentencing 
guidelines, they should be reviewed for national consistency and compatibility with the 
OHS regulatory regime.’ 144 In my view, such guidelines should not involve a grid, or the 
adaptation of more general guidelines. Rather the guidelines should provide courts with 
guidance as to appropriate mitigating and aggravating factors in sentencing, and guidance 
as to when and how to apply non-monetary penalties. 
 
The remaining recommendations in the First Report included that  
 there should be a system of appeals against a finding of guilt, and that the final 
appeal in each State and Territory should be to a court from which a further 
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appeal can lie to the High Court; but with no such appeals no appeals from 
acquittals.145 
o Crown immunity should not be provided for in the model Act. 146 
o the limitation period for initiating prosecutions should be two years from the 
occurrence of the offence or from the offence coming to regulator’s notice; or 
one year from a finding in a coronial inquiry that an offence occurred..147 
o the model Act should provide for or facilitate the presentation of victim impact 
statements to courts hearing category 1 and category 2 cases. 148 
o the model Act should ‘enshrine the rule against double jeopardy by providing 
that no person is liable to be punished twice for the same offence under the Act 




With three notable exceptions, the recommendations of the First Report National 
Review into Model Occupational Health and Safety Laws are quite conservative, in the 
sense that they fall well within the scope of the existing Australian OHS statutes. This is 
far from surprising. A range of factors have subjected the National OHS Review process 
to a strong gravitational pull towards drawing out the best of the provisions from the 
status quo in the various Australian OHS statutes. These factors include the Review’s 
Terms of Reference (requiring the Review Panel to identify areas of best practice, 
common practice and inconsistency and to make recommendations); the types of issues 
raised in the issues paper (which largely reflected the concerns of regulators, employers 
and their associations, and trade unions); the tenor of the submissions (most were based 
on current Australian provisions, and argued for the best of the current provisions in the 
Australian OHS statutes, with the submissions of regulators generally favouring their 
own provisions), and the relative political strengths of New South Wales and Victoria. A 
further factor could be the Review Panel’s apparent preference for the reports of reviews 
of the various Australian OHS regulatory systems Findings and proposals in the 
academic literature on OHS regulation are very rarely discussed in the Report. A perusal 
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of the references in the First Report reveals that very few academic articles or books are 
cited. 
 
Even one of the great innovations of the First Report – the primary general duty on 
persons conducting a business or undertaking – is drawn from the key Queensland 
general duty provision (which has been echoed in the new statutes in the two 
Territories), although as noted above the Review Panel has elevated the duty to an 
overarching primary duty, and broadened the definition of workers. One reason that the 
Panel may have been willing to make this significant proposal was the emphasis in its 
Terms of Reference on taking into account the changing nature of work and 
employment arrangements. 
  
A second major innovation is the duty imposed upon corporate officers. Even though 
the recommended provision is not currently to be found in an Australian OHS statute, it 
is drawn from a recommendation in the Victorian Maxwell Report. While many will 
argue that this recommendation could weaken the enforcement provisions of the model 
Act, by recommending a positive duty on officers of due diligence, by making this 
recommendation the Panel has done much to legitimate the First Report in the eyes of 
employers. 
 
Indeed, this change to the corporate officers provisions, and the other recommendations 
are likely to lead to suggestions, particularly from New South Wales and Queensland 
commentators, that enforcement would be weakened – that the onus of proving 
reasonable practicability should be placed upon the prosecutor in a prosecution of the 
general duties – have been countered by the recommendations that have caught most 
commentators by surprise: the three categories of offences and the very high financial 
penalties. Will the increased general and specific deterrence from these higher penalties 
outweigh the possible weakening of the prosecution provisions of the enforcement 
provisions brought by the changes to the corporate officer provisions and the provisions 
governing the onus of proving reasonably practicable? 
 
Evaluations of the Review Panel’s recommendations are, however, difficult to make in 
the absence of recommendations on the issues still to be addressed in the Second Report 
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– particularly the provisions in relation to worker representation, consultation, 
participation and enforcement.  
 
